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INTRODUCTION
In the United States, violence against indigenous women is unprecedented.1 According to
the Indian Law Resource Center, greater than 80% of indigenous women have experienced
violence of some kind, while greater than 50% of women have experienced sexual violence. 2 The
reported rates against indigenous women are at least ten times higher than the rest of the United
States.3 Most of these women never see their abusers brought to justice.4
For nearly 35 years following the Supreme Court’s decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish
Tribe, which held that tribal courts do not have criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, even if the
crime occurs on tribal land, the United States upheld a jurisdictional scheme which stripped tribal
courts of criminal authority over non-Indians, and thereby precluded tribal courts from
participating in the hearing and resolution of disputes regarding violence against indigenous
women.5 In fact, until the Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) was reauthorized in 2013, tribal
courts could not prosecute non-Indian perpetrators for any crime committed on tribal land.6 At
last, VAWA 2013 took one step in restoring criminal jurisdiction to tribal courts by providing the
courts with Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (SDVCJ).7 Upon passage of VAWA
2013, one survivor of abuse, Lisa Brunner, stated:
We have always known non-Indians can come onto our lands and
they can beat, rape and murder us and there is nothing we can do
about it.... Now, our tribal officers have jurisdiction for the first time
to do something about certain crimes. But it is just the first sliver of
the full moon that we need to protect us.8
As of 2018, five years following the reauthorization of VAWA with the provisions of the
SDVCJ, at least eighteen tribes have opted-in the special jurisdiction, leading to 143 arrests of 128

1

Throughout this Article, various terms referring to the indigenous population in the United States are used. For
example, the terms “indigenous,” “Native American,” and “Indian” should be understood to be used
interchangeably. Similarly, the terms “Indian Country” and “First Nations” should be understood to be
interchangeable. While the federal government uses the terms “Indian” and “Indian Country,” the author
appreciates and understands that “indigenous” and “First Nations” may be more preferred by some members of
these populations.
2
Ending Violence Against Native Women, INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, https://indianlaw.org/issue/endingviolence-against-native-women [https://perma.cc/FL4F-LXK7] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.; See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978).
6
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA) Reauthorization 2013, THE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
https://www.justice.gov/tribal/violence-against-women-act-vawa-reauthorization-2013-0 [https://perma.cc/9ABJZ5GA] (last updated Mar. 26, 2015).
7
Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN INDIANS,
http://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/sdvcj-overview [https://perma.cc/V9SU-RHN8] (last updated June 2019).
8
VAWA 2013’s Special Domestic Criminal Jurisdiction Five-Year Report, NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN
INDIANS (Mar. 20, 2018), http://www.ncai.org/resources/ncai-publications/SDVCJ_5_Year_Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/X2DD-WBWP].
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non-Indian abusers.9 Of these arrests, seventy-four led to convictions, four to acquittals, while the
remaining were pending as of publishing of the five-year report.10 While implementation of
SDVCJ has been overwhelmingly positive, it has also revealed areas where further resources and
assistance are needed. Of particular note, the breadth of SDVCJ is limited – as evidenced by its
name – to incidents of domestic violence or dating violence between romantic or intimate partners,
only.11
In particular, SDVCJ fails to include provisions protecting the children involved in 58% of
all criminal domestic violence incidents.12 Further still, VAWA 2013 fails to allow tribal courts
to charge non-Indians for crimes including, but not limited to, assault of law enforcement, stalking,
sexual contact (absent a domestic or dating relationship), endangering the welfare of a minor, false
imprisonment, violence against a victim’s family, and drug possession.13 Not only does SDVCJ
lack jurisdictional breadth, but for some tribes, the implementation of the jurisdiction is
prohibitively expensive, making it difficult to provide the resources necessary for effective
implementation.14 In particular, in order to implement or opt-in to SDVCJ, a tribe must meet the
statutory requirements set out in VAWA, which include for example, guaranteeing all rights under
the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA); ensuring all judges presiding over SDVCJ cases have the
necessary training; making all criminal laws, rules of evidence, and rules of criminal procedure
publicly available; and, providing indigent defendants with effective assistance of counsel.15
Satisfying these statutory requirements often requires that interested tribes revise existing tribal
codes, policies, procedures, and sometimes even constitutions – a process that is not only lengthy,
but also costly for the tribes.16
On April 4, 2019, the United States House of Representatives passed H.R. 1585, the bill
setting forth the fourth reauthorization of VAWA, which, if enacted, would expand tribal
jurisdiction further to include sexual violence, sex trafficking, stalking, criminal child abuse, and
violence against tribal law enforcement.17 As federal legislators have tended to unraveling the
jurisdictional maze that has plagued the indigenous population for decades, the members of the
tribes themselves have partnered with their state leaders to take action themselves.18 For example,
9

Id.
Id.
11
Joshua B. Gurney, An “SDVCJ Fix”—Paths Forward in Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction, 70 HASTINGS L. J. 887,
899-900 (2019).
12
See supra note 8.
13
Id.
14
Id.
15
VAWA 2013’s Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (SDVCJ), NATIONAL CONGRESS OF AMERICAN
INDIANS, https://www.ncai.org/tribal-vawa/overview/VAWA_Information__Technical_Assistance_Resources_Guide_Updated_November_11_2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/T8DG-5NQZ] (last
visited Feb. 7, 2021).
16
Id.
17
Lacina Tangnaqado Onco, Victory: The Violence Against Women Act Passes House with Tribal Provisions,
FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON NATIONAL LEGISLATION (Apr. 4, 2019), https://www.fcnl.org/updates/victory-the-violenceagainst-women-act-passes-house-with-tribal-provisions-2036 [https://perma.cc/Z7BM-S4CJ].
18
Melodie Edwards, 7 States Step Up Efforts to Fight Violence Against Indigenous Women, NATIONAL PUBLIC
RADIO (July 23, 2019, 5:01 AM ET), https://www.npr.org/2019/07/23/743659569/7-states-step-up-efforts-to-fight10
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tribes have lacked access to federal and state databases to track and locate victims of crimes. Of
5,712 cases of missing and murdered indigenous women reported in 2016, only 116 were entered
in a Department of Justice database.19 Responding to these dire statistics, seven states – Wyoming,
New Mexico, Montana, Minnesota, Arizona, California, and Nebraska – have adopted task forces
in an effort to take early steps in identifying and locating indigenous victims of crimes.20
However, neither VAWA 2019 or tribal tasks forces can fully rectify the damage left in the
wake of Oliphant, even considering the U.S. Supreme Court’s recent decision in McGirt v.
Oklahoma, rendered on July 9, 2020, which upheld that states do not have criminal jurisdiction
over crimes committed by Indians on Indian land.21 Specifically, VAWA 2019 still fails to
recognize the inherent power and sovereignty of tribal courts, a right which the United States has
ostensibly recognized since the colonization of this country, but which has been continuously
stripped over nearly two centuries of judicial and legislative actions. Until tribal criminal
jurisdiction is returned to tribal courts indigenous women will continue to be entrapped within a
complex jurisdictional scheme that makes it difficult – if not impossible – to receive justice for the
harms committed against them.
This Article is divided into three Parts. Part I will provide a contextual jurisdictional
history of how the prosecution of crimes against indigenous people have been shaped and
continuously limited by judicial and legislative action. Part I concludes with the introduction of
VAWA 2013, and the proposed VAWA 2019 revisions, introduced by Congress to help restore
some semblance of authority to the tribal courts. Part II will critically evaluate the role of the
federal government, that is, the legislature and judiciary alike, in the historical stripping of tribal
sovereignty, and will shed light on the role that bias has played in the creation and development
of Indian law doctrine. Part II will argue for the abrogation of Oliphant and restoring criminal
jurisdiction to tribal courts as a means of abolishing the systemic bias present in Indian law. Part
III will analyze the impacts such an action would entail through the lens of indigenous women,
including any impacts that would be felt by non-Indian defendants. Part III will further consider
the benefits and difficulties tribal courts will face in assuming jurisdiction over all defendants,
regardless of race or tribal affiliation, and will ask whether the institutional bias against indigenous
people and the first nations can ever truly be eliminated. Finally, Part III will consider whether
the bias can ever truly be eliminated in view of the nuanced tribal-federal relationship.

violence-against-indigenous-women [https://perma.cc/9RWJ-9F3G].
19
Chris Aadland, ‘A really good first step’: Task force could help state understand missing and murdered
Indigenous people problem, CASPER STAR TRIBUNE (July 22, 2019), https://trib.com/news/state-and-regional/areally-good-first-step-task-force-could-help-state/article_390a28f0-b05e-5648-b960-c46fde40abea.html
[https://perma.cc/3Z9D-BASA].
20
Edwards, supra note 18.
21
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020) (holding that the State of Oklahoma did not have the jurisdiction to
prosecute McGirt, who was charged with several sexual offenses. The Court abided by its prior precedent,
discussed herein, that jurisdiction for such crimes was limited to tribal and federal jurisdiction).
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I. BACKGROUND
As of November 2018, the Native American population in the United States was estimated
to be about 6.8 million – or about 2.03% of the entire population.22 Among Native American
women, over 80% have experienced violence, and more than 50% have experienced sexual
violence.23 On some reservations, the murder rate of indigenous women is more than ten times
higher than the national average.24 Yet, due to an “unworkable, race-based criminal jurisdictional
scheme” shaped and crafted by the United States federal government over the past several decades
– perpetuating ideologies and biases dating back to the colonization of this country – the majority
of these women never see their abusers brought to justice.25 Not only can tribal courts not exercise
jurisdiction over many of these abusers, as described in more detail in this Article, but the federal
government itself frequently declines to prosecute these cases, often citing to “weak or insufficient
evidence,” “no federal offense evident” or “witness problems.”26 In fact, between the years 2005
and 2009, the U.S. Attorney’s Office declined to prosecute about 52% (or about 4,000 cases) of
the violent crimes from Indian Country that were reported to them.27

22

American Indian and Alaska Native Heritage Month: November 2018, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU (Oct. 25,
2018), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/newsroom/facts-for-features/2018/cb18ff09-aian.pdf (inclusive
of those who identify as American Indian or Alaska Native, either alone or in combination with one or more other
races).
23
Annual Estimates of the Resident Population by Sex, Single Year of Age, Race Alone or in Combination, and
Hispanic Origin for the United States: April 1, 2010 to July 1, 2018, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU,
https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/tableservices/jsf/pages/productview.xhtml?src=bkmk (last updated June 2019);
Ending Violence Against Native Women, INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, https://indianlaw.org/issue/endingviolence-against-native-women [https://perma.cc/RX9C-JVS8] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
24
Ending Violence Against Native Women, INDIAN LAW RESOURCE CENTER, https://indianlaw.org/issue/endingviolence-against-native-women [https://perma.cc/RX9C-JVS8] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
25
Id. By a “race-based” jurisdictional scheme, it is meant that the race of each of the perpetrator and the victim (i.e.,
Indian or non-Indian) will dictate which of the tribe, the state, and/or the federal government has jurisdiction to
prosecute the crime. In Indian law, being “Indian” typically refers to a political identity, as opposed to a racial
identity. For example, in Morton v. Manaciari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974), the Court noted that the Bureau of Indian
Affairs did not discriminate against non-Indian employees by implementing hiring preferences for Indian
employees. The Court noted that the preference was “granted to Indians not as a discrete racial group, but, rather, as
members of quasi-sovereign tribal entities whose lives and activities are governed by the BIA in a unique fashion.”
The technical distinction between viewing Indian-status as a racial identity versus a political identity contributes to
the unworkable schemes within Indian Law, particularly within the context of criminal jurisdiction.
26
David C. Maurer, U.S. Department of Justice Declinations of Indian Country Criminal Matters (Dec. 13, 2010),
available at https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11167r.pdf at p. 3.
27
Id. The term “violent” does not have any specific criteria. A crime is considered to be “violent” or “nonviolent”
at the discretion of the prosecutor and may vary among districts.
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A. A Historical Framework: The Origins and Creation of the Jurisdictional Maze
In order to understand the contemporary relationship between Indian Country28 and the federal
government, we must first consider the complex and nuanced foundations upon which tribal
sovereignty within the federal government has been built. In particular, we must understand how
Indian reservations came to be under the idea of a “measured separatism,” which guaranteed
sovereignty to the indigenous people as the result of negotiated treaties and settlements between
the tribes and the federal government.29
1. A History of Tribal-Federal Relations: The Rise and Fall of a “Measured Separatism”
Upon the colonization of what is now the United States of America, European settlers and
early legislators guaranteed to the indigenous people certain rights as the result of negotiated
treaties.30 These treaties gave rise to the “measured separatism” between the tribes and the federal
government, which insulates the tribes from encroachment, but also ultimately subjects the tribes
to the power of the United States.31 In many ways, the colonization of Indian Country has
continued into more modern history, via both legislative and judicial action.32 However, at the
outset, from about 1774 until about 1832, the federal government negotiated treaties with Native
Americans under the notion of a “bargained-for” exchange in which the Indian tribes agreed to
make peace and relinquish land, while the federal government agreed to extend certain services to
Indian Country, such as funding and protection.33 Despite the power imbalance between the tribes
and the federal government in reaching many of these agreements, the treaties were intended to
recognize Indian land as free from the “incursion of both the state and non-Indian settlers.”34 In
effect, these treaties were made to recognize the inherent rights of the indigenous as a sovereign
people, rights that were passed down to them from their ancestors, who had their own inherent
rights that required no validation from the European colonizers.35

As provided in 18 U.S.C. § 1151, the term “Indian Country” means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian
reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and,
including rights-of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the borders of
the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory thereof, and whether within or
without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the Indian titles to which have not been extinguished,
including rights-of-way running through the same.
29
FRANK POMMERSHEIM, BRAID OF FEATHERS: AMERICAN INDIAN LAW AND CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL LIFE 16
(1995).
30
Id.
31
Id.
32
See generally Jessica Allison, Beyond VAWA: Protecting Native American from Sexual Violence Within Existing
Tribal Jurisdictional Structures 90 U. COLO. L. REV. 225 (2019).
33
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 29 at 17; see also American Indian Treaties, NATIONAL ARCHIVES
https://www.archives.gov/research/native-americans/treaties [https://perma.cc/UPH7-VF6T] (last reviewed Oct. 4,
2016).
34
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 29 at 17.
35
Native American Rights, https://law.jrank.org/pages/8754/Native-American-Rights.html [https://perma.cc/YW7HXPPL] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
28
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As a result of these treaties, Native Americans occupy a unique legal position in the United
States – even today. While they are citizens of the United States and can enjoy the benefits
associated with that status, they are also concurrently members of a self-governing tribe, whose
law and order predate the arrival or encroachment of any colonizer.36 It is important to recognize,
however, that these initial treaties, which essentially established the Indian reservations as we
understand them to exist today, were fueled by a cultural and racial bias that viewed the First
Nations as inherently inferior. This bias was, and continues to be, interwoven throughout the
tribal-federal relationship. The belief that “non-Indians could not live harmoniously with Indians,”
espoused by the federal government resulted in separate allocations of land for the Indian people.37
a. The Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790, 1799, and 1802
The Trade and Intercourse Acts of 1790, 1799, and 1802 were among the first federal
actions to create a jurisdictional buffer between Indians and non-Indians.38 Through these Acts,
Congress took control over all Indian affairs, pursuant to its rights to regulate commerce with
Indian tribes in Article one, Section 8 of the United States Constitution. In recognizing and
realizing the provisions of these Acts, the government maintained control over any contact
between Indians and non-Indians.39 For example, neither non-Indians nor the states could purchase
land from individual Indians or tribes without the approval of the federal government.40 The
federal government also exerted control over the regulation of trade among Indians, including the
prohibition of the sale of alcohol.41 In fact, non-Indian settlers were required to have a passport to
even cross the sovereign Indian lands.42 Furthermore, and significant to the analysis of this Article,
the federal government maintained criminal jurisdiction in these reservations, ceding some of it to
the states.43 Through the Trade and Intercourse Acts, Congress provided that a state could punish
crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians under the laws of the state.44

36

See POMMERSHEIM, supra note 29 at 17.
Id.
38
Id.
39
Id.
40
See 25 U.S.C. § 177; see also An Act to Regulate Trade and Intercourse With the Indian Tribes (1790),
UNIVERSITY OF OREGON, https://pages.uoregon.edu/mjdennis/courses/hist469_trade.htm [https://perma.cc/8QAPXSGQ] (last visited Mar. 26, 2020) (providing full text of the original act).
41
Id.
42
American Indian Treaties, supra note 33.
43
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 29 at 17.
44
Jurisdiction: Bringing Clarity out of Chaos, in A ROADMAP FOR MAKING NATIVE AMERICA SAFER,
https://www.aisc.ucla.edu/iloc/report/files/Chapter_1_Jurisdiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/BJ6A-ADHY]; see also 1
Stat. § 137 (1790); 1 Stat. § 743 (1799); 2 Stat. § 139 (1802). While the Trade and Intercourse Act of 1790 provided
a state could punish crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians under the laws of the state, the General
Crimes Act of 1817 later modified the states jurisdiction in such cases. See infra, note 64.
37
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b. The Marshall Trilogy
In a series of Supreme Court decisions, referred to as the “Marshall Trilogy,” the Court
acknowledged the inherent powers of the tribes.45 These cases – Johnson v. M’Intosh; Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia; and Worcester v. Georgia – each authored by Chief Justice John Marshall,
established federal primacy in Indian affairs46, excluded the states from invoking their laws in
Indian Country47, and acknowledged the inherent power of the tribes to self-govern.48 Specifically,
in Johnson, the Court affirmed federal authority over Indian affairs, which barred all land and
commercial transactions with Indians absent consent from the United States government, pursuant
to the Trade and Intercourse Acts.49
In Cherokee Nation, the Court had to determine whether a state could impose its laws on
Native Americans in response to Georgia’s attempt to force the Cherokee people off of the state’s
land.50 Rather than applying a substantive analysis on the factual issue, a deeply split Marshall
Court51 concluded that because Cherokee Nation did not qualify as a “foreign state,” but rather as
a “domestic dependent nation,” the Court lacked jurisdiction over the tribe.52 In his majority
opinion, Marshall wrote of the Cherokee:
They look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness
and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the
President as their Great Father. They and their country are
considered by foreign nations, as well as by ourselves, as being so
completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the United States
that any attempt to acquire their lands, or to form a political
connexion with them, would be considered by all as an invasion of
our territory and an act of hostility.53
The Cherokee Nation decision effectively established that Indian Country was not susceptible or
bound by the laws of the states in which these “domestic dependent nations” resided.54

45

Matthew L.M. Fletcher, A Short History of Indian Law in the Supreme Court, AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION (Oct.
1, 2014), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/crsj/publications/human_ rights_magazine _home /2014_vol_40/vol-40--no--1--tribal-sovereignty/short_history_of_ indian_law/ [https://perma.cc/44XJ-GAN9].
46
Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543 (1823).
47
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
48
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832); Fletcher, supra note 45.
49
Johnson, 21 U.S. at 543; see also infra note 80.
50
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 1.
51
Only Marshall and one other Justice, J. Gabriel Duvall, signed onto the majority opinion. Each of Justices
William Johnson and Henry Baldwin concurred in the outcome, but wrote individual opinions against Indian
interests. Justice Smith Thompson wrote the dissenting opinion, which Justice Joseph Story joined.
52
Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17. The issue involved a claim under Article III of the Constitution, which provides
the Supreme Court with original jurisdiction over claims between a State of the citizens thereof, and foreign states,
citizens, or subject.
53
Id. at 17-18.
54
See id.
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The last case of the Marshall Trilogy, Worcester v. Georgia, is credited for building the
foundations of the doctrine of tribal sovereignty.55 In Worcester, the plaintiff, a missionary living
with the Cherokee who helped establish the Cherokee Phoenix,56 worked with the Cherokee Nation
to utilize the courts to push back against the westward expansion of the states. The state of Georgia
had passed a law prohibiting all white men, such as Worcester, from living on Native American
land without a license.57 While the law was intended to prevent white men from encroachment on
Indian territory, Worcester, joined by eleven other missionaries and supported by the Cherokee,
published a resolution against the law reasoning that the law effectively forced the Cherokee
Nation into relinquishing its inherent sovereignty to govern its own land. 58 When the law took
effect, Worcester and the eleven other men were arrested and convicted.59 Worcester appealed to
the Supreme Court.60 In ruling in favor of Worcester, the Court held that state laws have “no
force” in Indian Country and that only the federal government had the authority to deal with Indian
nations.61 In the last case of this trilogy, Marshall wrote:
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its
own territory, with boundaries accurately described, in which the
laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia
have no right to enter, but with the assent of the Cherokees
themselves, or in conformity with treaties, and with the acts of
congress. The whole intercourse between the United States and this
nation, is by our constitution and laws, vested in the government of
the United States.62
Thus, the Court made absolutely clear that the laws of the states have no impact on Indian
Country.63
c. General Crimes Act to Crow Dog, and Congress’s Response
While Justice John Marshall penned opinions still referenced today by advocates of
indigenous rights, Congress drafted laws to expand federal control over the tribes of Indian
55

See generally Matthew L.M. Fletcher, The Iron Cold of the Marshall Trilogy 82 N.D. L. REV. 627 (2006).
The first Native American newspaper.
57
In accordance with the provisions of the Trade and Intercourse Acts.
58
Richard Mize, Worcester, Samuel Austin (1778-1859), THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF OKLAHOMA HISTORY AND
CULTURE, https://www.okhistory.org/publications/enc/entry.php?entry=WO020 [https://perma.cc/B2TN-N56D]
(last visited Mar. 26, 2020).
59
Tim Alan Garrison, Worcester v. Georgia (1832), NEW GEORGIA ENCYCLOPEDIA (Apr. 27, 2004),
https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/government-politics/worcester-v-georgia-1832
[https://perma.cc/SVN9-2TNL].
60
Id.
61
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
62
Id. at 561.
63
Id. Significantly, however, President Andrew Jackson refused to enforce the Court’s decision, resulting in the
forceful removal of Cherokee Nation from Georgia via the Trail of Tears. See Trail of Tears, HISTORY (Nov. 9,
2009), https://www.history.com/topics/native-american-history/trail-of-tears [https://perma.cc/A5RJ-65JR].
56
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Country. In 1817, the Second Congress of the United States passed the General Crimes Act which
extended federal criminal jurisdiction to cover some crimes committed by Indians against nonIndians (e.g., federal crimes of general applicability such as assault of a federal officer), as well as
all crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian Country.64 Notably, the Act did not
grant federal jurisdiction over crimes committed by Indians against Indians, which remained in the
purview of tribal law and custom.65
This measured separatism, at least as it applied to the tribe’s criminal jurisdiction over its
own people against its own people, came to a screeching halt by 1885, however, when Congress
passed the Major Crimes Act in response to the Supreme Court’s decision in Ex Parte Crow Dog.66
In Crow Dog, an Indian man, known as Crow Dog, shot and killed another Indian man, Spotted
Tail, on Indian land.67 Crow Dog petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing
that the crime with which he was charged and convicted was not illegal under the laws of the
United States, and that the district court had no jurisdiction to try him under the provisions of the
General Crimes Act, which reserved crimes by Indians against Indians to the tribes.68 The district
court had found that the murder of Spotted Tail was a crime of general applicability (i.e., that it
violated the general federal statute against murder, which was extended to Indian Country by the
General Crimes Act) and therefore claimed jurisdiction.69 The Supreme Court granted the writ of
habeas corpus, holding that there was no federal jurisdiction over the crimes committed by Indians
against Indians, in accordance with the provisions of the General Crimes Act.70 In its opinion, the
Supreme Court left no doubt of its conviction that the tribe should be exclusively responsible for
handling such matters:
It is a case where, against an express exception in the law itself, that
law . . . is sought to be extended over aliens and strangers; over the
members of a community, separated by race, by tradition, by the
instincts of a free though savage life, from the authority and power
which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an external and
unknown code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil
conduct, according to rules and penalties of which they could have
no previous warning; which judges them by a standard made by
others, and not for them, which . . . makes no allowance for their
inability to understand it. It tries them not by their peers, nor by the
customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors
of a different race, according to the law of a social state of which
they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the
traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest
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prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the red man's
revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality.71
Reacting to the Supreme Court’s defense of tribal jurisdiction of crimes by Indians against
Indians, Congress promptly passed the Major Crimes Act, thereby expanding federal jurisdiction
over seven – later amended to sixteen – distinct crimes committed by Indians in Indian Country,
regardless of the race of the victim.72 These crimes include, in part, murder, manslaughter, rape,
kidnapping, incest, felony child abuse or neglect, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and
robbery.73
The constitutionality of the Major Crimes Act did not go unchallenged, and was first tested
in United States v. Kagama. In Kagama, the defendant and his son, Mahawaha, were charged in
the murder of their neighbor, Iyousa, with whom the defendant had recurring property disputes.74
The murder occurred on the Indian reservation.75 Despite the local district attorney’s decision not
to prosecute, consistent with the practice of not intervening in crimes between Indians, the U.S.
Attorney for Northern California forcefully prosecuted the case under the authority of the Major
Crimes Act.76 In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court upheld the Major Crimes Act.77 The
Court justified that this expansion of federal jurisdiction over Indians was constitutional due to the
dependent status of the tribes as wards of the federal government.78 In so holding, the Major
Crimes Act became the first systemic intrusion of the federal government into the internal affairs
of the tribes.79 The measured separatism had crumbled.
Following Kagama and the Major Crimes Act, the level of control of Congress over Indian
life continued to evolve. In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903), the Supreme Court
coined the unilateral control of Congress over tribes as its “plenary authority,” (i.e., plenary power)
which had been “exercised by Congress from the beginning, and [had] always been deemed a
political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial department of the government.” The
decision, rooted in paternalism and bias, viewed the tribes as “weak,” “helpless,” and wholly
dependent on the federal government. From this dependence, said the Court, arose the “duty of
protection,” and therefore Congress’s power to unilaterally limit, modify, or eliminate any rights
possessed by the tribes.80 The plenary power doctrine, which has continued to expand over time,
71

Id. at 571.
23 Stat. 362, 385 (1885).
73
18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018).
74
MARK STUART WEINER, AMERICANS WITHOUT LAW: THE RACIAL BOUNDARIES OF CITIZENSHIP 36 (2006).
75
United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886). At trial, after the Supreme Court had rendered its opinion, it was
revealed that the crime occurred just outside the boundaries of the reservation to the north. The dispute decided by
the Supreme Court was only on the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction, following which the trial was held.
76
Sidney L. Harring, The Story of United States v. Kagama, in INDIAN LAW STORIES 150 (Carole Goldberg, Kevin
K. Washburn, & Phillip P. Frickey, eds., 2011).
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
CANBY, supra note 64 at 149-50; see generally Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886).
80
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 567 (1903); Indian Trade and Intercourse Act, CHICKASAW TV VIDEO
NETWORK, https://www.chickasaw.tv/events/indian-trade-and-intercourse-act [https://perma.cc/JX7Z-TT4V] (last
visited Mar. 26, 2020); see also Federal Indian Law for Alaska Tribes, U OF ALA. FAIRBANKS,
72

267

was a stark deviation from the principles of inherent tribal authority espoused in the Marshall
Trilogy. While “there is no acceptable, historically-derived, textual constitutional explanation for
the exercise of any federal authority over Indian Tribes without their consent manifested through
treaty,” the Supreme Court introduced this new doctrine that has manifested in Congress the
authority to create binding legislation without tribal consent.81
2. Major Crimes Act to Oliphant: Involuntary Assimilation and the Continuing Assault
on Tribal Sovereignty
Following the Major Crimes Act, a series of federal acts continued to undermine and
destroy the traditional tribal culture and institution. In particular, the General Allotment Act of
1887, also known as the Dawes Act, created individual parcels of Indian land held in trust by the
federal government.82 Passed under the administration of President Grover Cleveland, the Act was
motivated by the federal government’s interest in assimilating the First Nations and encouraging
them to undertake farming and agriculture.83 To do so, tribal land needed to be broken up into
individual plots.84 The Dawes Act was described by President Theodore Roosevelt as “a mighty
pulverizing engine to break up the tribal mass. It acts directly upon the family and the
individual.”85 The Dawes Severalty Act authorized the government, via the Bureau of Indian
Affairs, to hold 160 acres of tribal land in trust for a period of twenty-five years for each head of
household.86 At the end of the twenty-five years, individuals who took up residence on the
allotment of land, away from their tribes, were granted United States citizenship.87 In 1906,
however, before the twenty-five year trust had expired, allotments of land were authorized for fee
transfer to Indians deemed to be “competent” under the Burke Act, which amended the Dawes
Act.88 Competency was determined, in part, by whether the individual was one-half degree Indian
blood or less.89 According to the Burke Act, any Indian who took up residence away from the
tribe and “adopted the habits of civilized life” was declared a citizen and received with that status
all of its immunities and privileges.90 As a result of the Dawes and Burke Acts, each rooted in the
presumed inferiority of indigenous people, their humanity, and their culture, tribal land was
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reduced from 138 million acres in 1887 to 52 million acres in 1934.91 Moreover, the reservations
became “checkerboards” of tribal, individual Indian, individual non-Indian, and corporate land.92
While the Indian population continued to undergo an involuntary assimilation in their dayto-day lives due to the loss of their land, the convoluted interactions between the federal, state, and
tribal courts became even more muddled. In 1953, Congress passed Public Law 280 without
consent from the tribes.93 Public Law 280 mandated the transfer of jurisdiction from the federal
government to state governments in six states – California, Minnesota, Nebraska, Oregon,
Washington, and Alaska94 – granting these states both civil and criminal jurisdiction over the tribal
lands within their borders.95 While Public Law 280 increased the role of states in moderating and
prosecuting criminal activity on Indian land, it allocated no federal funding for the states and it
resulted in confusion for law enforcement agencies and courts, to the detriment of tribes.96
Moreover, Public Law 280 was passed in spite of ample Indian testimony that was overwhelmingly
in opposition to the law.97 The law, purporting to “free” tribes from federal supervision, was in
effect an attempt to terminate tribes by assimilation.98 Indeed, the land of many small tribes was
sold to the highest bidder, effectively ending tribal sovereignty and forcing tribes to rely on the
states for education, land use, and other economic and social services..99 As Congress only
mandated this transfer of power in six states, Public Law 280 failed to provide uniform guidance
for the tribal courts and Native Americans in states where passage was merely optional, thereby
adding to the complexity of the already convoluted jurisdictional scheme.100
In 1978, the assault on sovereign tribal criminal jurisdiction continued and intensified. In
a split and landmark decision in Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, the Supreme Court further
stripped tribal courts of jurisdiction over their lands and people.101 The Court held that tribal courts
lack any jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders for crimes committed on Indian land.102 In
Oliphant, the plaintiff, who was petitioning for a writ of habeas corpus, was a non-Indian living
as a permanent resident with the Suquamish tribe on Port Madison Indian Reservation in northwest
Washington.103 In August 1973, Oliphant was arrested and charged by tribal police with assaulting
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a tribal officer and resisting arrest during an annual celebration, called Chief Seattle Days.104
Oliphant’s petitions for the writ of habeas corpus were denied by the lower courts.105 In particular,
the Ninth Circuit upheld tribal criminal jurisdiction over Oliphant, a non-Indian who committed a
crime on Indian land as an important part of its tribal sovereignty.106 “Surely the power to preserve
order on the reservation, when necessary by punishing those who violate tribal law, is a sine qua
non [i.e., an essential condition] of the sovereignty that the Suquamish originally possessed,” stated
the court.107
However, the Supreme Court disagreed in a controversial split decision.108 In its majority
opinion, the Court cited an “unspoken assumption” of Congress that tribal criminal jurisdiction
did not extend to non-Indians, and argued that tribes “must depend on the Federal Government for
protection from intruders.”109 In so holding, the Court analogized to Crow Dog, asserting that, just
as the Court in Crow Dog found it would be unfair to subject Indians to an “unknown code”
imposed by people of a different “race [and] tradition” from their own, it would be just as unfair
to subject Oliphant, a non-Indian to the codes of the tribe.110 Although separated from the
expressly racist language of the Court in Crow Dog by ninety-five years, the Court’s parallel
analysis in Oliphant demonstrates the pervasiveness of the bias against the First Nations within
the most powerful institutions of the United States. In a decision that reflected the Court’s bias, it
was decided that exclusive tribal jurisdiction over crimes not enumerated in the Major Crimes Act
was narrowly limited to crimes by Indian offenders against Indian victims, only.111 The tribes’
inherent authority to regulate and govern its own land and people – in accordance with their early
treaties with the federal government – had been disrespected and ignored.
By 1990, the lack of jurisdiction over crimes not enumerated in the Major Crimes Act was
temporarily rendered more exclusive by the Supreme Court.112 In Duro v. Reina, the Court
concluded that tribal courts had no jurisdiction over the crimes of nonmember Indians.113 As a
result of this decision, a “jurisdictional void” was created, where for certain crimes, none of the
federal, state, and tribal governments had the power to prosecute nonmember Indian offenders.114
Thus, Congress quickly amended the Indian Civil Rights Act to incorporate the power of the tribal
courts to “exercise criminal jurisdiction over all Indians” in recognition of its sovereignty.115 This
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amendment, known as the “Duro-fix,” has since been upheld by the Supreme Court, therefore
overturning the decision of Duro.116
Thus, by the end of the 20th century, the “inherent power” and sovereignty granted to the
Native Americans via the mutually agreed upon treaties with the European colonizers had fractured
into an unworkable and prejudiced scheme which failed to prioritize any interests of First Nations.
3. McGirt v. Oklahoma: A Glimmer of Hope
On July 9, 2020, the Supreme Court rendered its long-awaited decision in McGirt v.
Oklahoma, a dispute regarding the jurisdiction of the state of Oklahoma over its indigenous
population.117 In its 5-4 holding, the Court honored the 19th century treaties made between the
federal government and the First Nations, although it also upheld the plenary power doctrine by
recognizing that the inherent authority of the tribes can only be disestablished through a “clear
expression of congressional intent.”118 Here, petitioner Jimmy McGirt, a member of the Seminole
Nation whose crimes were committed on the Muscogee (Creek) Nation Reservation, asserted that
the state had no jurisdiction to prosecute him under the laws of the state, and that he must be
granted a new trial in federal court based on the provisions of the Major Crimes Act (MCA).119
Specifically, his appeal turned on whether his crimes were committed on the land of “Indian
Country,” thereby granting jurisdiction to the federal government and the tribe, or if, as Oklahoma
argued, they occurred on state land.120
Holding that the crime occurred on the Creek Reservation, the majority stated that the
Creek Nation was promised a reservation in perpetuity.121 Noting the previous restrictions and
expansions Congress had made on tribal authority, Justice Gorsuch wrote, “As a result, many of
the arguments before us today follow a sadly familiar pattern. Yes, promises were made, but the
price of keeping them has become too great, so now we should just cast a blind eye. We reject
that thinking.”122 Absent express withdrawal of the promised reservations from the First Nation
by Congress, the Court upheld the jurisdictional scheme subjected to the First Nations under the
MCA.123 Although this holding does little to demystify the jurisdictional maze, or to restore full
tribal authority to the First Nations themselves, the passionate opinion from the Court reinvigorates
and initiates a new momentum in the fight for elimination of the institutional bias against the First
Nations built into the present-day framework of the country. Indeed, while the decision in McGirt
has little, if any, impact on the day-to-day lives of non-Indian citizens living on Indian territory,
as noted by two indigenous female scholars, it does “preserve the right of the Muscogee Nation’s
Lighthorse Police [i.e., Muscogee Nation’s law enforcement] to protect the lives of Native women
116

U.S. v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004).
McGirt v. Oklahoma, 140 S. Ct. 2452 (2020).
118
Id. at 2457; see also 7 Stat. 418.
119
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2457; see supra notes 77, 78, 111, and accompanying text.
120
McGirt, 140 S. Ct. at 2459.
121
Id. at 2482.
122
Id. at 2482.
123
Id.
117

271

living within the Muscogee Nation’s borders.”124 Moreover, although this decision did not
ultimately render McGirt accountable for his crimes, it marked an important recognition of tribal
sovereignty by a federal institution. This tribal sovereignty is “inextricably linked” to the safety
and lives of indigenous women.125 Indigenous women could briefly exhale – the decision provided
a renewed sense of agency for them to hold abusers accountable under tribal law.
II. CONTEMPORARY TRIBAL CRIMINAL JURISDICTION: THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT,
REAUTHORIZATIONS THEREOF, AND CURRENT LEGISLATION
More recently, Congress has improved its efforts in recognizing and protecting victims of
violence in Indian Country. In particular, the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of
2005 (VAWA 2005) first introduced specific provisions directed to the safety of indigenous
women.126
A. The Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2005 (VAWA 2005)
The Violence Against Women Act was first signed into law by President Bill Clinton in
1994 and was subsequently reauthorized in 2000.127 In 2005, Congress prepared another
reauthorization (VAWA 2005) which contained, for the first time, a title specifically directed to
the “Safety for Indian Women.”128
Signed into law by President George W. Bush on January 5, 2006, VAWA 2005 passed
each of the House and Senate with nearly unanimous support.129 It was the first act of Congress
explicitly recognizing, and acting in response to, the epidemic of violence faced by Native
American women.130 In particular, Title IX of VAWA 2005 noted in its findings that “1 out of
every 3 Indian (including Alaska Native) women are raped in their lifetimes;” that “Indian women
experience 7 sexual assaults per 1,000, comparted with 4 per 1,000 among Black Americans, 3 per
1,000 among Caucasians, 2 per 1,000 Hispanic women, and 1 per 1,000 Asian women;” and that
“the unique legal relationship of the United States to Indian tribes creates a Federal trust
responsibility to assist tribal governments in safeguarding the lives of women.”131 In fact,
Congress explicitly provided that the purpose of this new title was “to strengthen the capacity of
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Indian tribes to exercise their sovereign authority to respond to violent crimes committed against
women.”132
Title IX of VAWA 2005 included numerous provisions for the promotion of safety of
Native American women, such as the authorization for tribal law enforcement agencies to access
national criminal information databases, increased punishment through federal prosecutions for
repeat domestic violence offenders who have at least two tribal convictions, and authorization for
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) officers to arrest, without a warrant, persons reasonably
believed to have committed certain domestic violence offenses.133 Moreover, it authorized the
consolidation of VAWA tribal grants to create a single VAWA tribal grant program designed to
enhance the tribes’ ability to respond to crimes against women and to enhance safety training and
education.134 This consolidated program allowed tribes to submit a single application for most of
the tribal grant programs offered by the United States Department of Justice (DOJ). It further
created a tribal unit in the Office on Violence Against Women and a Deputy Director for Tribal
Affairs.135 Additionally, VAWA 2005 mandated annual tribal-federal VAWA consultation
between the DOJ and tribal governments.136
Despite the acknowledgement that the relationship between the federal government and
tribal governments was “unique,” and that the federal government has a responsibility for assisting
tribes, VAWA 2005 did nothing to address the jurisdictional maze created by the decades of
legislation and judicial decisions that came before it. That is, VAWA 2005 did not authorize tribal
courts to exercise their inherent jurisdiction over non-Indian offenders for any crime, thus
maintaining the status quo of Oliphant. Thus, the safety of women in Indian Country was still
determined by the race, or Indian status, of her abuser. Should that abuser be a white man, she
could not rely upon her Nation’s law enforcement or government to protect her.
B. The Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2013 (VAWA 2013)
Thirty-five years after the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Oliphant, which remains,
in relevant part, good law137, Congress took the first steps to restore the “inherent power” of tribal
courts to exercise criminal jurisdictions via the third reauthorization of the Violence Against
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Women Act (VAWA 2013). However, this “inherent power” as provided by VAWA 2013 was
limited to a specific and enumerated number of situations.138 Significantly, VAWA 2013 was the
first federal act – by either Congress or the judiciary – that acknowledged and responded to the
fractured and unworkable jurisdictional maze left in the wake of Oliphant.139
VAWA 2013, which was signed into law on March 7, 2013, by President Barack Obama,
granted tribal courts “Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction” (SDVCJ) over a limited
number of crimes, regardless of the race or Indian status of the offender.140 This specialized
jurisdiction affirmed the inherent sovereign authority of tribal governments to exercise criminal
jurisdiction over certain non-Indians who violate qualifying protection orders or commit domestic
or dating violence against Indian victims on tribal lands.141 However, the law specifies that a
participating tribe may exercise special domestic violence criminal jurisdiction over a defendant
only if the defendant (1) resides in the Indian Country of the participating tribe; (2) is employed in
the Indian Country of the participating tribe; or (3) is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating partner
of a member of the participating tribe or an Indian who resides in the Indian Country of the
participating tribe.142 Moreover, as noted by the name, these select defendants could only be tried
in tribal court if their crime was an incident of domestic violence between romantic or intimate
partners, only.143 Accordingly, the special jurisdiction does not allow tribal courts to prosecute
offenders who are strangers or even acquaintances of the victim, and significantly, does not allow
tribal jurisdiction over crimes such as criminal child abuse, stalking, alcohol and drug use, and
false imprisonment – crimes that can all frequently arise in settings of domestic violence.144
The table provided below, adapted from the Tribal Court Clearinghouse and a report by
the Indian Law and Order Commission, summarizes the current framework of criminal jurisdiction
of the federal, state and tribal courts over crimes occurring on tribal land, as of the passing of
VAWA 2013.145
All Other
All Other
Major Crime*
Major Crime*
Crimes
Crimes
Status
Public Law 280
Non-Public Law 280
Indian offender
Indian victim
Indian offender
Non-Indian victim

State/Tribal

State/Tribal

Federal/Tribal

Tribal

State/Tribal
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Federal†/Tribal
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Non-Indian offender
Indian victim

‡

Non-Indian offender
Non-Indian victim

State

State

Federal

Federal†

State

State

State

State

*As defined by the Major Crimes Act.
†
Under authority of the General Crimes Act
‡
Tribal jurisdiction for crimes under VAWA 2013 if tribe has opted for SDVCJ.
As a result of SDVCJ, Congress restored tribal sovereignty to a small, though meaningful,
degree. By the end of 2018, at least twenty-two tribes had implemented this special jurisdiction,
leading to 143 arrests of 128 non-Indian abusers.146 Of these arrests, seventy-four (about 50%)
led to convictions, and five (about 3.5%) led to acquittals.147 However, as Jessica Allison aptly
notes in her analysis of the SDVCJ provisions of VAWA 2013, “the fact that only twenty-two of
the 573 federally recognized tribes have implemented VAWA 2013 demonstrates that there remain
barriers to eradicating sexual violence in Indian Country.”148
One such barrier to the implementation of SDVCJ by the tribal courts is the prohibitive
expense and need for resources.149 This is not a burden unique to the implementation of this special
jurisdiction – tribal justice systems have been underfunded for decades.150 As described by the
Pascua Yaqui Tribe:
In addition to the direct costs of complying with the prerequisites
(indigent defender systems, jury trials, incarceration, etc.),
substantial indirect costs are also likely to be required. For example,
who will review and propose changes to your laws and procedures?
Who will train law enforcement, prosecutors, judges, court staff and
defense counsel on the new laws and procedures and how they
work? What funding will be required to make these changes? To pay
for any additional prosecutors, judges, defense counsel, and court
staff? To pay to publish the laws and regulations? To process the
licensing and educational requirements? To implement the jury
selection process? To pay for incarceration? Where will these funds
come from? Is that source of funding stable and reliable?151
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To minimize these expenses, various tribes have collaborated to create share strategies and
information about SDVCJ implementation.152 For example, the few tribes that have implemented
SDVCJ have largely relied on the models and support of fellow tribes, as well as the use of contract
defense attorneys.153 Although VAWA 2013 authorized $5,000,000 for each of fiscal years 2014
through 2018 for SDVCJ implementation, the Office on Violence of Women (OVW) has awarded
a total of $5,684,939 in competitive grant funds, allocated amongst fourteen different tribes to
support their implementation of SDVCJ.154 Ultimately, only four implementing tribes—Tulalip,
Little Traverse Bay Band, Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians, and Standing Rock—received any
of these grant funds.155 Yet none of these tribes have used any of these funds to prosecute, likely
because these funds were exhausted by the mere steps needed to effectively implement the special
jurisdiction (e.g., training, revising tribal codes, etc.).156
C. The Violence Against Women Act Reauthorization Act of 2019 (VAWA 2019)
On April 4, 2019, the United States House of Representatives took another step in
expanding upon the SDVCJ provided in VAWA 2013, by passing the fourth reauthorization of
VAWA (VAWA 2019).157 Responding to some of the limitations of VAWA 2013, the 2019
reauthorization proposes to expand tribal jurisdiction further to include additional violent
crimes.158 However, VAWA 2019 still significantly and unnecessarily limits the inherent authority
of the tribes by failing to grant tribal courts jurisdiction over all criminals, regardless of their race
or that of their victims. This failure, like all those before it, is rooted in the underlying bias against
the First Nations and a deep, perhaps unconscious, belief in the inferiority of these Nations and
their courts as compared to those of the federal government. As of the writing of this Article,
VAWA 2019 is calendared for an unspecified date in the Senate.159
III. ANALYSIS
The rationale of the decisionmakers at each of the stages of creation of the tribal court
jurisdictional maze has been rooted in bias against indigenous people and the First Nations.
Evidence of this bias and disdain for indigenous culture and history has been peppered throughout
decisions rendered in the highest echelons of our judicial system, and in statements of the most
advanced legislative body in this country. But this bias is pervasive. It is still present in the
modern-day interactions between tribes and the federal government, in each of the judiciary and
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the legislature. Armed with the recognition of this bias, this Article argues for the abrogation of
the decision rendered in Oliphant as one means of acknowledging and abolishing this bias. Despite
the provisions drafted specifically for Indian Country, VAWA 2013 and 2019 have simply not
gone far enough to restore safety to indigenous women and the First Nations.
A. VAWA 2019 Fails to Sufficiently Protect Indigenous Women
As noted above, the United States House of Representatives passed the Violence Against
Women Reauthorization Act of 2019 (H.R. 1585) on April 4, 2019, after a largely party-line vote
with 230 Democratic and thirty-three Republican representatives voting in favor of the bill.160
In relevant part, the bill broadens the Special Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction
granted to tribal courts by the VAWA 2013 reauthorization and uses a new term to describe this
expanded jurisdiction: “Special Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction.” This new jurisdiction amends
SDVCJ to include jurisdiction over stalking, sex trafficking, sexual violence, domestic violence
(expanding the definition from VAWA 2013), assault of a law enforcement or correctional officer,
and obstruction of justice.161 While these expanded authorizations are necessary and will help
restore some semblance of sovereignty to tribal courts and Indian Country, Congress must pass
legislation allowing tribal courts to have absolute criminal jurisdiction over their lands and their
people, without caveats to the types of crimes involved. That is, Congress must, at the very least,
statutorily abrogate the Oliphant decision.
Yet, Congress will never take such action until it recognizes and acknowledges that the
complex jurisdictional scheme created throughout the history of this country has been built on
centuries of white bias and prejudice against Native American tribes, citizens, culture, and
tradition. In particular, Congress must confront the harmful and dangerous belief that Native
Americans lack sufficient competence or authority to govern their own lands, and it must recognize
the role this belief has played in the restriction of rights and scope of tribal court jurisdiction and
sovereignty throughout history.
1. Returning to the Historical Context: Acknowledging the White Bias
The expansion of criminal tribal jurisdiction to absolute – or at least nearly absolute –
jurisdiction over Indian lands would not be unheard of in the history of this country. In fact, the
passage of time has only led to the erosion of tribal jurisdiction through various Congressional and
Supreme Court interferences. At the time of European discovery – or invasion – of America, tribes
were, of course, completely sovereign “by nature and necessity,” in that they conducted and
regulated their own affairs acting independently and without any external power that was required
160
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to legitimize their authority.162 Upon their invasion of the new world, however, the Europeans
claimed dominion over all territories, seemingly limiting this pre-existing tribal sovereignty, and
leaving, in many cases, the Supreme Court to resolve the resulting uncertainties.163
The Supreme Court has never had a Native American justice in their ranks, let alone a
justice with any substantial Native American education or knowledge. In fact, there have only
been three Native American federal judges in the history of our country: Billy Michael Burrage
(former chief judge of all three districts of the U.S. District Courts for Oklahoma), Diane Joyce
Humetewa (current judge for the U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona; former judge of
the Hopi Appellate Court, Keams Canyon, Arizona), and Frank Howell Seay (former chief judge
of the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Oklahoma).164 Similarly, only twenty-two
Native American individuals have ever served in Congress, and the first ever Native American
Cabinet secretary, Debra Haaland, was sworn into office under President Joe Biden on March 17,
2021.165 So, it comes as no surprise that each of the Supreme Court, Congress, and the Executive
Branch has been a large factor in the creation and perpetuation of the jurisdictional maze dictating
and limiting a tribal court’s sovereignty over its own lands and people.
In the 1800s, Chief Justice Marshall had several opportunities to evaluate the status of
Indian tribes, and for the most part, recognized the sovereignty of the tribes as separate “states”
within the country:
So much of the argument as was intended to prove the character of
the Cherokees as a state, as a distinct political society separated from
others, capable of managing its own affairs and governing itself, has,
in the opinion of the majority of the judges, been completely
successful.166
And when faced with the opportunity a year later, Marshall reiterated this status:
The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct,
independent, political communities, retaining their original natural
rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil, from time
immemorial, with the single excepted of that imposed by irresistible
power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other
European potentate than the first discoverer of the coast of the
particular region claimed . . . .167
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Thus, under the Marshall Court, and after the conclusion of the Marshall Trilogy, tribes were
viewed as sovereign and free from all state intrusion on that sovereignty in all but two ways: (1)
requirement that tribes can only convey land to the federal government; and (2) lack of ability to
deal with foreign powers.168
Following the Marshall Trilogy, however, the decisions rendered by the Supreme Court
took a dark turn, which some have argued “memorialize[] the darkest decades for Indian people in
American history.”169 Specifically, in Crow Dog, the Court held that the federal court had no
jurisdiction over an Indian man who murdered another Indian man in Indian Country.170 While on
its face, this outcome aligns with the tribal courts’ desired scope of criminal jurisdiction, the
rationale the Court used to reach that decision gives crystal clear insight into the explicit bias
against the competence of the indigenous. For example, although ultimately holding in favor of
Indian Country handling its own internal criminal matters, the Court held, in an opinion penned
by Justice Stanley Matthews and wrought with a profoundly explicit bias:
It is a case where, against an express exception in the law itself, that
law . . . is sought to be extended over aliens and strangers; over the
members of a community, separated by race, by tradition, by the
instincts of a free though savage life, from the authority and power
which seeks to impose upon them the restraints of an external and
unknown code, and to subject them to the responsibilities of civil
conduct, according to rules and penalties of which they could have
no previous warning; which judges them by a standard made by
others, and not for them, which . . . makes no allowance for their
inability to understand it. It tries them not by their peers, nor by the
customs of their people, nor the law of their land, but by superiors
of a different race, according to the law of a social state of which
they have an imperfect conception, and which is opposed to the
traditions of their history, to the habits of their lives, to the strongest
prejudices of their savage nature; one which measures the red
man's revenge by the maxims of the white man's morality.171
Thus, the Court held not in favor of the tribe because it viewed the tribe as a separate state capable
of handling its own affairs, but rather because it believed that the “savage” tribe of “red men”
would have been unable to understand the law of the white man.
Congress acted swiftly, distraught with the Court’s recognition of tribal sovereignty in
Crow Dog. Within two years following the decision, the Major Crimes Act was passed, stripping
tribal courts of criminal jurisdiction over seven distinct crimes committed by Indians in Indian
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Country, regardless of the race of the victim. In particular, the original Major Crime Act provided
that:
[A]ll Indians, committing against the person or property of another
Indian or other person any of the following crimes, namely, murder,
manslaughter, rape, assault with intent to kill, arson, burglary, and
larceny within any Territory of the United States, and either within
or without an Indian reservation, shall be subject therefor to the laws
of such Territory relating to said crimes, and shall be tried therefor
in the same courts and in the same manner and shall be subject to
the same penalties as are all persons charged with the commission
of said crimes, respectively; and the said courts are hereby given
jurisdiction in all such cases; and all such Indians committing any
of the above crimes against the person or property of another Indian
or other person within the boundaries of any State of the United
States, and within the limits of any Indian reservation, shall be
subject to the same laws, tried in the same courts and in the same
manner, and subject to the same penalties as are all other persons
committing any of the above crimes within the exclusive jurisdiction
of the United States.172
The legislative history of this act explicitly demonstrates that the legislatures, just like the Court
in Crow Dog, saw Native Americans as uncivilized savages. In particular, in the debate to pass
the Major Crimes Act, quoted above, Rep. Cutcheon of Michigan stated, “I do not believe we shall
ever succeed in civilizing the Indian race until we teach them regard for law, and show them that
they are not only responsible to the law, but amenable to its penalties.”173 Furthermore, during the
congressional debate, the term “or other person” was added following “another Indian” to ensure
that all Indians were to be prosecuted in federal court for any of the crimes committed, regardless
of the race or status of the victim.174 Notably, the bill was passed to provide the federal government
with concurrent criminal jurisdiction, which it shared with the tribe. It was not until Oliphant,
over 150 years later, that criminal tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians was judicially removed.175
In the Oliphant decision, the Court announced the third limitation176 on tribal sovereignty:
the exercise of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was inconsistent with the domestic,
dependent status of the tribes.177 In rendering this decision, the Court pointed to 200 years of
federal legislation, which it argued “assum[ed] that Indian tribal courts are without inherent
jurisdiction to try non-Indians, and must depend on the Federal Government for protection from
intruders.”178 Therefore, the Court held that, absent any express legislation from Congress
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permitting tribal courts to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the courts had no such
power.
However, at the time of the decision, tribes had previously been recognized as sovereign
“domestic dependent nations,” in part by the Marshall Court. Therefore the relevant inquiry was
whether the federal government had passed any legislation preventing tribes from acting within its
inherent sovereignty – not whether the federal government provided any legislation permitting the
tribes to act.179 Thus, by rendering its decision in Oliphant, the Supreme Court opened the
dangerous door to the discovery and enforcement of “inherent” limitations on tribal sovereignty,
the effects of which have reverberated in countless decisions that have come down from the high
Court in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries.
For example, as a result of Oliphant, tribes lost the power to regulate liquor sales on tribal
land and to regulate hunting and fishing by non-Indians on non-Indian-owned land within its
reservations.180 These decisions were based in the Court’s narrow view that the tribes retained
inherent power only to protect self-government and to control “internal relations” defined as
including “the power to punish tribal offenders, . . . to determine tribal membership, to regulate
domestic relations among members, and to prescribe rules of inheritance for members.”181
The jurisdictional maze has only gotten more complicated as Congress reacts to decisions
handed down by the high court. In 1990, the Supreme Court further narrowed tribal jurisdiction
by holding that tribes did not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmember Indians on their
reservations – that is, the Court changed course from the pattern of Congressional legislation
basing criminal jurisdiction on the defendant’s status as an Indian, regardless of the tribe.182
Congress swiftly overruled the Court by defining tribal powers of self-government to include the
“exerciser [of] criminal jurisdiction over all Indians.”183 However, passing the legislation raised
the question of whether by acting, Congress had conferred power on to the tribes to punish
nonmember Indians, or if it had simply recognized an inherent tribal power to assert such criminal
jurisdiction.
Based on Congress’s reactionary approach to decisions from the Supreme Court, it remains
to seen how Congress decides to act in the wake of McGirt v. Oklahoma, which, despite having
no impact on resolving the jurisdictional maze, provided a glimmer of hope that overcoming the
bias against the First Nations within our government could be achieved. However, the decision,
which expressly granted Congress the sole authority to withdraw the promises it made to the First
Nations in the 19th century, could have detrimental effects if Congress were to side with the
Governor of Oklahoma, who asserts that the decision will “disrupt Oklahoma’s criminal justice
system and free dangerous criminals.”184
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2. A Hard Look at the Modern Bias Against the First Nations
Although the opinions and debates on the House and Senate floors have lost the explicit
and blatant disregard for the status of Native Americans as citizens of the United States that were
once prevalent in those of the 19th and early 20th century, the bias against Native Americans still
exists in the opinions and actions of the courts and legislature today. The modern existence of an
implicit bias185 against Native Americans by the general public of the United States provides
sufficient evidence in and of itself that the federal government does not view tribal courts as having
the competence to handle its own internal affairs.
In 2017, National Public Radio (NPR) conducted a study to evaluate discrimination against
Native Americans in the United States.186 The study found that Native Americans reported
discrimination against them in each of the institutional and individual contexts.187 For example,
about 30% of Native Americans reported they had been discriminated in their employment – e.g.,
when applying for jobs or in their pay – and about the same amount reported they had been they
discriminated against by the police and/or by the courts.188 The study concluded that, overall, 75%
of Native Americans believe there is institutional and individual discrimination against indigenous
people in the U.S. today.189
This bias is not just recognized by the general Native American population. It has also
infiltrated the way state and federal courts view the competence and ability of tribal courts.
Though the definition of “competence” has advanced significantly since the days of the Burke Act,
in which the competence of a Native American was determined based on the amount of Indian
blood they had or didn’t have,190 there have been documented incidents in which tribal courts have
been subject to that same discrimination.
In December 2010, tribal judge Claudette White from Southern California attempted to file
a petition order for a Native women who had been attacked, and whose attacker was still at large.191
In response to hearing that Native women had been having issues registering issued protection
orders with the county, Judge White delivered it to the sheriff herself, hoping to ease the process.192
At this time, VAWA 2013 had not been passed, so when Judge White appeared in front of the
sheriff deputy, she was told that nothing could be done.193 Judge White immediately contacted a
185

See, e.g., Implict Bias in the Law, UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT SCHOOL OF LAW
https://libguides.law.uconn.edu/implicit#s-lg-box-13817521 [https://perma.cc/GFM8-XMPR] (last visited Mar. 26,
2020) for one analysis of the role of “implicit bias” in the law.
186
DISCRIMINATION IN AMERICA: EXPERIENCES AND VIEWS OF NATIVE AMERICANS, NATIONAL PUBLIC RADIO
(Nov. 2017), https://www.npr.org/documents/2017/nov/NPR-discrimination-native-americans-final.pdf.
187
Id.
188
Id.
189
Id.
190
POMMERSHEIM, supra note 29 at 20.
191
Emma Cueto, In Indian Country, A ‘Maze of Injustice’ Persists for Women, LAW360 (Sept. 15, 2019),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1197831 [https://perma.cc/4XMF-4TWZ].
192
Id.
193
Id.

282

California state judge, Judge Juan Ulloa, and asked him to speak to the officers. Judge White
recounts, “As soon as I put him on, their attitudes changed . . . You know, ‘Yes judge, right away,
judge.’ Completely different from the way they were treating me.”194 Although the tribal courts
and California state courts soon worked out a system to get protective orders issued by tribal courts
registered with the sheriff, the system remains imperfect, and undermines the authority of the tribal
court to have to receive a sign-off from a state court.195 As Judge White acknowledges, “Those
are all steps that are not required under the law . . . But that’s the end-run we’re required to create
to protect our members.”196
Where tribal courts lack jurisdiction under VAWA 2013, for example, in a criminal child
abuse case, the tribes must request and rely upon FBI intervention. The FBI, however, has limited
resources and its agents are often overburdened and located far away from the reservations. As of
the end of 2018, the FBI had only 140 special agents and 40 victim specialists assigned to assist in
cases within Indian Country, which includes over 1,000,000 people.197 Thus, it is unsurprising
that between the years 2005 and 2009, the U.S. Attorney’s Office declined to prosecute about 52%
(or about 4,000 cases) of the violent crimes from Indian Country that were reported to them.198
B. Congress Must Statutorily Abrogate the Oliphant Decision
While the passage of VAWA 2019 would substantially expand the ability of tribal judges
like Judge White to protect the women of her tribe, it does not go far enough in restoring the full
extent of inherent tribal sovereignty as it pertains to criminal tribal jurisdiction. Until such inherent
authority is restored, tribal courts will always have to jump through hoops to demonstrate and
effectuate authority and competence. Restoration of this inherent authority can and must
necessarily be achieved by the statutory abrogation of the Supreme Court’s 1978 decision in
Oliphant.
The analysis of the Court in its Oliphant decision expressly abandoned the long-standing
principles of Indian law. Prior to Oliphant, the Supreme Court had interpreted the boundaries of
tribal jurisdiction and sovereignty by relying on clear congressional statements abrogating tribal
jurisdiction over non-Indians.199 Rather than maintaining the status quo, the Court adopted an
“unspoken assumption” theory which fatally stripped all tribal courts of all criminal jurisdiction
over non-Indian defendants. Citing to outdated and irrelevant lower court decisions,200
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congressional reports, and other questionable evidence in support, the Court concluded that
because of the “implicit divesture doctrine,”201 tribal courts, in fact, never had jurisdiction over
non-Indian defendants in the first place.202 Notably, the Oliphant Court stated, at the end of the
opinion:
We recognize that some Indian tribal court systems have become
increasingly sophisticated and resemble in many respects their state
counterparts. We also acknowledge that with the passage of the
Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which extends certain basic
procedural rights to anyone tried in Indian tribal court, many of the
dangers that might have accompanied the exercise by tribal courts
of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians only a few decades ago
have disappeared. Finally, we are not unaware of the prevalence of
non-Indian crime on today's reservations which the tribes forcefully
argue requires the ability to try non-Indians. But these are
considerations for Congress to weigh in deciding whether Indian
tribes should finally be authorized to try non-Indians.203
Thus, not only did the Court briefly acknowledge the sophistication of some tribal courts (and
impliedly, the unsophistication of others – additional evidence of the bias against these courts),
the Court left open the door to Congress to pass legislation to restore criminal tribal jurisdiction
over non-Indians.
Other than VAWA, Congress has not remained completely silent on the inherent rights of
tribes. In 1978, after the Oliphant decision was rendered, Congress passed the Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA).204 ICWA was enacted in response to the removal of indigenous children
from their homes by state child welfare systems and private adoption agencies.205 A 1969 survey
by the Association of American Indian Affairs found that at least twenty-five percent of all Indian
children were separated from their families and placed in white, non-Indian homes and boarding
schools.206 Between 1969 and 1974, that percentage increased to at most thirty-five percent of all
Indian children.207 In passing ICWA, Congress sought to protect the relationship between Indian
children and Indian families and custom and to preserve inherent tribal authority:
201
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[I]t is the policy of this Nation to protect the best interests of Indian
children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes
and families by the establishment of minimum Federal standards for
the removal of Indian children from their families and the placement
of such children in foster or adoptive homes with will reflect the
unique values of Indian culture.208
ICWA has not gone unchallenged. Most recently the Fifth Circuit upheld ICWA, holding against
the states of Texas, Louisiana, and Indiana which claimed that protections for Indian children and
families constituted illegal racial discrimination, and that ICWA’s federally mandated state court
standards illegally “commandeer” state courts and agencies to carry out a federal scheme.209
However, after so concluding, the court reheard the case en banc in January 2020.210 As of the
writing of this Article, the court had not yet rendered its final opinion.
ICWA and VAWA are but two relatively modern responses to the pervasive prejudice
against the First Nations that still exist today. The passage of these legislations has undoubtedly
benefited Indian culture, but not enough to correct the hardships the government and its agencies
have bestowed upon them over time.
Each of these responses fails to acknowledge or address the use of education as a weapon
forced assimilation of Indian children into Western civilization.211 Schools that were designed by
the federal government to “inoculate Indian children with the virtues and values of Western
civilization and to eliminate the traces of Indian cultures.”212 Schools that resorted to corporeal
punishment of children, imprisoned disobedient students in school jails, cut the traditionally long
hair of Indian children, and forced instruction in English.213
Each of these responses fails to acknowledge the mysterious and forced sterilization of
approximately 25% of Indian women of child-bearing age beginning in 1962.214 Women who
signed consent forms to undergo emergency Caesarian-section deliveries, only to later discover
they had also consented to tubal ligations or hysterectomies.215 Or women who only consented to
such procedures out of fear of losing welfare benefits.216 Or even women who consented to such
procedures after being convinced they were unfit mothers.217
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In the forty-two years that have passed since Oliphant, violence against indigenous women
has only gotten worse. While Senate approval of VAWA 2019 will fill some of the gaps left in
the wake of VAWA 2013, such as providing the ability for tribal courts to prosecute mere
acquaintances or even strangers who commit violent crimes against Native women – which
constitutes the vast majority of sexual assault cases – it does not go far enough to recognize and
resolve the systemic biases that have limited tribal jurisdiction and doubted tribal competence since
before the Marshall era.
IV. IMPACT
Abrogating the Oliphant decision would not come without challenges, but would be a
significant first step in acknowledging white bias and entrusting the First Nations with the
authority they are owed. Restoring criminal tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians could have both
advantageous and disadvantageous impacts on the law and order of Indian Country, and more
specifically, on indigenous women. It would undoubtedly face backlash upon reaching the Senate
floor, particularly with respect to the due process of the non-Indian defendant. Though this change
would have broad implications regarding the tribal court system and the tribal-federal relationship,
abandoning the principles of the Oliphant decision is necessary to properly confront the modern
manifestations of white supremacy that continue to oppress indigenous peoples.
A. Impact on Indigenous Women
First and foremost, the abrogation of Oliphant would allow more indigenous women to
have their day in court and to see the perpetrators of their harm finally brought to justice. In
addition to these basic moral and ethical advantages of restoring criminal tribal authority over nonIndian defendants, the abrogation of Oliphant would improve the socioeconomic effects associated
with the current justice system.
Native American reservations often reside in remote areas of vast, sprawling states. Take
for instance the Blackfeet Indian Reservation, which sits at the eastern edge of the Rocky
Mountains in northwest Montana.218 Travel to the local tribal court from the reservation amounts
to about 1.5 miles.219 In contrast, the closest federal court is 127 miles from the reservation – more
than a 2-hour drive away. 220 Fort Peck, home to two separate First Nations – the Assiniboine and
Sioux Tribes – is similarly situated in Montana and requires at least a 9-hour round trip drive in
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good weather.221 These situations are not rare, impacting indigenous women from Montana to
Wyoming to Arizona, in reservations both large – like Blackfeet – and small – like Fort Peck.
These distances can have drastic effect on victims of violent crimes who wish to see their
abusers brought to justice. On top of emotional invasion of their mind and bodies, these women
must also bear the financial costs of traveling long distances – including fuel, lodging, food, and
the like – in order to see their day in court.222 While some FBI programs exist to provide some
compensation or transportation to witnesses and victims from reservations to federal court, these
resources are stretched thin.223 “Taking a trip to Billings or Great Falls is not something you just
do,” explained Fawn Williamson, a victim-and-witness specialist on the Fort Belknap reservation
in Montana.224 When a U.S. attorney requested her to appear in court with the defendant on a
Tuesday, following a subpoena issued the previous Friday, she had to decline due to the time
commitment and financial burden imposed.225
By restoring criminal jurisdiction over non-Indian defendants to the tribal courts, not only
will those Native Americans involved in the trial (e.g., petitioners, witnesses, jurors, etc.) have
easier access to the court, but so would any Native American involved in any crime occurring in
Indian Country. The beneficial effects of the proposed resolution go beyond just crimes against
women and extend to all crimes committed against any individual.
While some may argue that in some cases the particular federal court is more accessible
than the tribal court, the proposed resolution (i.e. the abrogation of Oliphant) is not to restore
exclusive criminal jurisdiction to the tribal courts. Rather, the federal and tribal courts would have
concurrent jurisdiction over these cases. Therefore, in the 52% of cases where the federal
government declines to prosecute these non-Indian defendants, the tribal court would be able to
step in and provide victims with means to justice.226
B. Impact on Non-Indian Defendants
In the debates on the House floor, the largest opposition to the amendments passed by
VAWA 2019 are those relating to the “due process concerns” of the non-Indian defendant.227
Although the VAWA 2019 opposition did not elaborate on these concerns, it is likely that these
concerns draw parallels to those concerns raised during the debates on VAWA 2013 and the
SDVCJ provisions. In particular, in 2013, the opposition questioned whether tribal courts would
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adhere to constitutional protections granted to defendants, such as trial by a jury of your peers.
That is, at the time of the 2013 passage, the opposition appeared to be concerned with the jury
being composed of all Native American individuals.
This argument is wrongfully wrought with the bias discussed at length in this Article
against Native American people. It necessarily assumes the fact that a Native American juror
would not be able to be an impartial and objective observer. Moreover, it ignores the fact that nonNative American people live on reservations. Advocates of VAWA 2013 argued as such, and
noted that tribal juries are not racially homogenous.228 Notably, the passage of VAWA 2013 was,
in part, contingent on the tribal courts honoring the constitutionally required protections for
defendants.229
C. Impact on Tribal Court System and Tribal-Federal Relations
The implementation of the restoration of criminal jurisdiction to the tribal courts would
undoubtedly have benefits, but could also induce hardships – at least initially – on tribal courts.
Among the most obvious benefits would be that the authority and competence of tribal judges, like
Judge White, would no longer be systemically undermined by any requirement to have state or
federal oversight of their actions.230 Tribal court systems would be free to file orders and render
decisions in criminal suits without the worry of that action not being recognized as binding, and
without the competence of the judge – or the entire system – being called into question. That is,
the abrogation of Oliphant would necessarily require Congress to at least implicitly acknowledge
the bias against tribal court systems.
However, implementing this change may bear a substantial financial burden on the tribal
courts – particularly the courts of smaller Nations with less robust judiciaries. Like the SDVCJ
provisions, implementation of a broader statutory scheme will be expensive, and will require
funding, access to resources, support, and services to assist in the effective implementation. Tribal
courts, which have been operating under limited jurisdiction for over forty years, may be
understaffed and ill-equipped to deal with an influx of new dockets and investigations.
Thus, in making this statutory change, Congress will need to allocate funds to the tribal
court systems, as it did with SDVCJ, to help ease these changes. But as the bearer of the funds,
Congress will undoubtedly maintain oversight into the distribution and allocation of the assistance,
which makes ample room for the bias to remain. There are currently 574 federally recognized
tribes in the United States.231 This number is not wholly inclusive of all tribes present in the United
States, such as the majority of Alaska Native tribes and Native Hawaiian tribes, the latter of which
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are ineligible for federal recognition.232 The receipt of federal assistance and access to federal
services is contingent on a tribe’s recognition by the federal government, and in order to secure
federal recognition, a tribe must accede to some level of federal oversight and control.233 The
current federal recognition process is “badly broken” and in some cases, has taken over 30 years
to consider a tribe’s application.234 Further, the already limited federal funding allocated to
recognized tribes, in combination with prosperity in gaming on some reservations, has encouraged
some tribes to remove individual members from the tribes in a process known as disenrollment:
“The logic is simple: Reducing the number of tribal members means more money for those who
remain.”235 In some smaller tribes with affluent gaming profits, monthly payments of $15,000 or
more are made to members.236
Tribal disenrollment presents an interesting obstacle for those arguing in favor of full tribal
sovereignty, in which the tribes would be free of incursion from the federal government. That is,
to enforce full tribal sovereignty would be to permit tribes to engage in disenrollment as a function
of its internal civil jurisprudence. Tribes could legally strip its members of their Indian identity
and access to tribal resources, such as health care and educational grants.237 In cases where
members are receiving substantial monthly payments from the tribe, the effects of disenrollment
are upending.
The federal government’s oversight of tribal disenrollment has not always been constant.
Throughout the twentieth century, the federal government asserted authority and control over tribal
disenrollment practices.238 However, in 2010, the government assumed a hands-off approach,
citing to the inherent authority of the tribes.239 This approach resulted in rampant disenrollment
of members until about 2016, when many tribes ended the practice and reinstated disenrolled
members.240 Nevertheless, tribes still engage in this process, to the detriment of many individuals,
and critics have noticed that the rise and fall of disenrollment is closely tied to the federal
government’s behavior toward the practice.
Full tribal sovereignty – and thus full abolishment of white bias against tribes – may not
be reasonably achievable within the current, modern tribal-federal relationship. There will always
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be nuances and individual considerations. As no two Nations are alike, the tribal, state, and federal
courts and legislatures must work together to create schemes that are sustainable within each
reservation, state, and region. While these schemes are developed, Congress must act to abrogate
Oliphant in order to take a first step in restoring tribal criminal jurisdiction and safety to First
Nations. The outcome will be worth it. As noted by Professor Sarah Deer, “There’s really no
excuse for [Congress refusing to eliminate the jurisdictional maze] in this day and age to have
these limits on tribal jurisdiction . . . It’s demeaning and it’s dangerous.”241
V. CONCLUSION
The judicial and legislative history of the United States has gradually and continuously
assaulted the rights and inherent authority of Native Americans to govern and regulate their own
lands. Although fueled by the desire to maintain independent and separate control, rather than
respect for customs and traditions, the initial treaties made between the Native Americans and the
European colonizers recognized and granted this inherent authority to the tribes. Ever since,
numerous Supreme Court decisions and reactive legislative decisions, shaped and evident of bias
against the Native American people, have stripped the tribes of any semblance of control over their
lands.
Violence against Native American women is unprecedented, and oftentimes committed by
non-Indian offenders, who are well aware that little to nothing will be done to hold them
accountable. By stripping tribal courts of jurisdiction over these defendants, the Supreme Court
in Oliphant turned a blind eye to the inherent authority of Indian Country and invoked more power
in the federal court, who more often than not declines to prosecute these cases. The system is
fractured.
The first step in restoring authority to tribal courts is to recognize and wholeheartedly
acknowledge the bias and prejudice that has been the fuel to the assault on tribal jurisdiction, since
as early as 1883.242 Once Congress can accept the fact that the assault on Native Americans has
included both legislative and judicial assaults, just as much as it has been a violent or sexual assault
against Native American women, it can take the first steps to repair these harms. Statutorily
abrogating the Oliphant decision will restore law and order to Indian Country and will allow Native
American victims of violence to have greater access, power, and ability to see their abusers brought
to justice.
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